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PLACING THE GOVERNMENT IN FRAGILE
DEMOCRACIES
David Fontana

INTRODUCTION
The first protests of the Arab Spring began in December of 2010
in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia.1 Within a few months, the autocratic
leaders of Tunisia and Egypt had been dethroned, and democratic
elections and new constitutions followed in relatively short order.2
From that point, the common fates of these two countries started to
diverge—and diverge for reasons that scholars have not yet entirely
recognized.
The new Constitution of Egypt solidified Cairo as the capital,3
and the new Egyptian national government centralized itself near
Tahrir Square in Cairo.4 By contrast, Article 50 of the interim
Tunisian Constitution provided that “[t]he headquarters of the
Chamber of Deputies shall be located in Tunis and the suburbs

 Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University School of
Law. My thanks to Richard Albert, Eugene Mazo, and the editors of the Wake
Forest Law Review for inviting me to the symposium on “Constitution-Making
and Constitutional Design” at Boston College Law School. For comments on
this Essay, my thanks to Michael Abramowicz and Naomi Schoenbaum.
1. Arab Uprising: Country by Country—Tunisia, BBC (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482315.
2. See id.; Greg Botelho, Arab Spring Aftermath: Revolutions Give Way to
Violence, More Unrest, CNN (Mar. 28, 2015, 1:52 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015
/03/27/middleeast/arab-spring-aftermath/.
3. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 26 Dec. 2012, art. 220
(“Cairo is the capital of the State.”) (translated from Arabic by author); see also
id. art. 92 (“The seats of both the House of Representatives and the Shura
Council are in Cairo.”) (translated from Arabic by author); id. art. 175 (“The
Supreme Constitutional Court is an independent judicial body, seated in
Cairo . . . .”) (translated from Arabic by author). An unofficial full translation of
the 2012 Egyptian Constitution can be found at http://constitutionaltransitions
.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Egypt-Constitution-26-December-2012.pdf.
4. See Matt Ford, A Dictator’s Guide to Urban Design, ATLANTIC (Feb. 21,
2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/02/a-dictator’sguide-to-urban-design/283953/ (“Cairo’s layout also made Tahrir Square the
perfect place to launch a revolution. Centrally located in Egypt’s largest city,
Tahrir sits near the Egyptian parliament, Mubarak’s political party
headquarters, the presidential palace, numerous foreign embassies, and hotels
filled with international journalists to broadcast footage of the protests for
audiences around the world.”).
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thereof.”5 In Tunis, government offices were distributed across the
greater Tunis metropolitan area, with some crucial parts of the
national government even located in Bardo, a suburb of Tunis.6
Come the summer of 2013, a new wave of popular mobilizations
influenced Egypt and Tunisia, and these differences in the
geography of national power were part of the equation.7 Video
images showed opponents of the Egyptian regime occupying Tahrir
Square and surrounding the Egyptian government.8
Several
months later, when protests emerged in Tunis, video images showed
a split screen of protesters trying to disrupt the government in
central Tunis at the same time as other protesters were taking
public transportation out to the suburbs to protest there as well.9
This is just one example of a larger blind spot for those studying
democratic transitions: geography.10 The central issues to address
as countries manage democratic transitions have long occupied the
attention of social scientists.11 In recent decades, legal scholars
5. DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, Apr. 22, 2013, art. 50
(translated from Arabic by author) (emphasis added). An unofficial full
translation of the 2013 Tunisian Draft Constitution can be found at
http://constitutionaltransitions.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Tunisia-third
-draft-Constitution-22-April-2013.pdf.
6. See Roua Khlifi, Ennahdha and Allies Reject Calls for NCA Dissolution,
TUNISIALIVE (July 31, 2013, 4:26 PM), http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/07/31
/ennahdha-and-others-reject-calls-for-nca-dissolution/ [https://web.archive.org
/web/20130803171125/http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/07/31/ennahdha-and
-others-reject-calls-for-nca-dissolution/].
7. There were many variables that undermined the Egyptian regime that
did not undermine the Tunisian regime, none of which were necessarily
conclusive. For a helpful discussion of this, see JASON BROWNLEE ET AL., THE
ARAB SPRING: PATHWAYS OF REPRESSION AND REFORM (2015). The only point to be
made here is that Egypt’s differential treatment of the geography of national
power was part of the progression of events.
8. Protests Continue in Egypt’s Tahrir Square, NBC NIGHTLY NEWS (June
30, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/video/nightly-news/52359178#52359178.
9. Louafi Larbi, National Strike, Protests and Clashes as Tunisia Mourns
for Assassinated Opposition Leader, RT (Feb. 9, 2013, 8:58 AM),
https://www.rt.com/news/tunisia-belaid-funeral-protests-741/.
10. For an excellent, related paper about the geography of the Arab Spring,
see generally Ellis Goldberg, The Urban Roots of the Arab Spring (Apr. 20,
2014)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2426960 (arguing that a swift overthrow of a government can
typically only occur in countries with a primate capital city like Egypt and
Tunisia). For a related paper about democratic activity and geography at the
level of the metropolitan area rather than the country, see generally Brian B.
Knudsen & Terry N. Clark, Walk and Be Moved: How Walking Builds Social
Movements, 49 URB. AFF. REV. 627 (2013) (analyzing the relationship between
urban environments and social movement organizations).
11. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND
OPPOSITION (1971) (discussing conditions that favor or impede democratic
transitions); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991) (examining the causes, processes, and
consequences of various democratic transitions between 1974 and 1990); Juan J.
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have also started to examine democratic transitions.12 Geography is
featured in debates about democratic transitions but largely in
debates about federalism in fragile democracies.13 Scholars focus on
the arguments for and against separating power across space and
across different governmental units.14 Democratic transitions must
address another, equally important question related to geography,
one raised by the Egyptian and Tunisian narratives provided above:
the geographical distribution of national power.
One of the most crucial decisions that a fragile democratic
system designing its constitution must address is where to place
national power.
Constitutions usually do address where the
national government will be located, simply because it is difficult to
coordinate governmental actions without a consensus definition of
where government convenes.15 This is an issue that those drafting
constitutions have spent much time considering. Scholars, however,
have not yet provided a framework for understanding how this
important decision is to be made—and particularly how it shapes
the representative nature of an emerging democratic regime. If one
of the ambitions of democracy is to feature a representative
government, then one of the key means by which that representative
government can be achieved is through locational decisions related
to the national government.
The goal of this Symposium Essay is to sketch out very
generally the different options that constitution designers have at
their disposal in deciding where to locate national power and the

Linz, Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration, in THE BREAKDOWN OF
DEMOCRATIC REGIMES 3 (Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan eds., 1978) (analyzing
prominent changes in political regimes to evaluate the process of the breakdown
of democracy and the conditions for democratic stability); Seymour Martin
Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and
Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959) (analyzing conditions
associated with the existence and stability of democratic societies that are
external to the political system).
12. See generally ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS (2009) (discussing the effects of democratic transitions on
constitutional stability); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000)
(analyzing legal responses and the role of law in the context of political
transformation).
13. See, e.g., ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION MAKING UNDER OCCUPATION:
THE POLITICS OF IMPOSED REVOLUTION IN IRAQ 232–33 (2009); LARRY DIAMOND,
SQUANDERED VICTORY: THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AND THE BUNGLED EFFORT TO
BRING DEMOCRACY TO IRAQ 163 (2005).
14. See, e.g., AOIFE O’DONOGHUE, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN GLOBAL
CONSTITUTIONALISATION 34–38 (2014).
15. Rules locating the national capital function as a “coordination rule,”
meaning that they are “logically impossible . . . to create” without some initial
agreement about their content. Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of
Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 366 (2004). It is difficult—if
not impossible—for a legislature to convene, for instance, without prior, formal
agreement about where that legislature is to convene. Id.
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central implications of each of these options for how representative
the national government of an emerging democratic regime is likely
to be. The goal is not to endorse one option as superior in all
contexts, but simply to provide a roadmap of the paths that can be
taken and the implications of each of these paths for the central
democratic goal of generating a representative national
government.16
I. THE CHOICES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE LOCATION OF NATIONAL
POWER
Locating national power in fragile democracies drafting
constitutions involves two dimensions of choices. First, a decision
must be made regarding how many locations will feature national
power. Second, regardless of how many locations feature national
power, decisions must be made regarding what type of metropolitan
area will feature national power. These locational choices have two
dimensions of implications related to the representativeness of
national power. Where the national government is located will
influence the identity of the officials exercising national power and
will also influence the interactions of the officials exercising national
power.
A.

The Choices

As an initial matter, constitution designers must decide
whether to create a single national center of power or multiple
national centers of power. Some countries, like Germany and South
Africa, have located different parts of the national government in
different metropolitan areas.17 Other countries, like the United
States, have centralized national power more in a singular
metropolitan area.18

16. Other implications of placing governments in fragile democratic
regimes are saved for another essay.
17. See Alan Mabin, South African Capital Cities, in CAPITAL CITIES IN
AFRICA: POWER AND POWERLESSNESS 168, 168 (Simon Bekker & Göran Therborn
eds., 2012); Richard L. Merritt, The Lost Center: Dispersing Berlin’s Capital
City Functions, 1945–78, in WESTERN EUROPEAN CITIES IN CRISIS 185, 185, 194
(Michael C. Romanos ed., 1979).
18. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (referencing a single “District” with
“ten miles square” as “the Seat of the Government of the United States”)
(emphasis added). The Twenty-Third Amendment later reiterated this. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1 (referencing “[t]he District constituting the seat
of Government of the United States” and how its representation in Congress
would compare to “a State”) (emphasis added). The Residence Act of 1790
states that “[a]ll offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in
the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere.” 4 U.S.C. § 72 (2012) (emphasis
added). See generally David Fontana, The Spatial Separation of Powers (2015)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the advantages of
physically separating federal power across several metropolitan areas and
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Once constitution designers have decided how many national
centers of power there shall be, they then must decide between
different types of metropolitan areas in which to locate national
power. Three genres of choices are possible. First, constitution
designers can decide to place national power in a primate
metropolitan area.19 A primate area is an area that is the single
dominant metropolitan area within a country20—Cairo in Egypt is a
great example.21 In most countries, the primate metropolitan area
is also the primary (or exclusive) capital metropolitan area.22
Second, national power can be placed in a major metropolitan
area that is not the single dominant metropolitan area within
national borders. A country without a primate metropolitan area
can choose to place national power in the most substantial
metropolitan area, even if that substantial metropolitan area does
not rise to the level of a primate metropolitan area. An example of
this could be the Constitution of Ukraine after the fall of the Soviet
Union,23 which placed national power in Kiev, a major metropolitan
area but not a primate metropolitan area. Even with a primate
metropolitan area, a country could place national power in a
different major metropolitan area. The Czech Republic, for instance,
located the constitutional court in Brno rather than in Prague
critiquing the current system of spatially unified federal power in the United
States).
19. Scholars have started to use the term “metropolitan area” rather than
“city” because of the vast range of forces encompassed in the modern urban
form. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs as Exit, Suburbs as Entrance, 106
MICH. L. REV. 277, 278 (2007).
20. See generally Alberto F. Ades & Edward L. Glaeser, Trade and
Circuses: Explaining Urban Giants, 110 Q.J. ECON. 195 (1995) (investigating
the factors behind the concentration of a nation’s urban population in one city);
Sebastian Galiani & Sukkoo Kim, Political Centralization and Urban Primacy:
Evidence from National and Provincial Capitals in the Americas, in
UNDERSTANDING LONG-RUN ECONOMIC GROWTH: GEOGRAPHY, INSTITUTIONS, AND
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 121 (Dora L. Costa & Naomi R. Lamoreaux eds.,
2011) (investigating the role of provincial and state capitals in Latin America
and the United States); Mark Jefferson, The Law of the Primate City, 29
GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 226 (1939) (investigating the role of primate cities around
the world); Arnold S. Linsky, Some Generalizations Concerning Primate Cities,
55 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 506 (1965) (testing six different hypotheses
on the conditions under which primate cities occur).
21. Cairo is home to approximately a quarter of Egypt’s population, and is
many times larger than the second largest metropolitan area (Alexandria). See
The World Factbook—Egypt, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the
-world-factbook/geos/eg.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20150912032354
/https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html] (last
updated Sept. 4, 2015) (listing Cairo’s population at 18.772 million and
Alexandria’s population at 4.778 million).
22. See Galiani & Kim, supra note 20, at 121 (“[I]n almost every country,
the primate city [is] usually a capital city . . . .”).
23. UKR. CONST., art. 20, para. 7 (1996) (“The capital of Ukraine is the City
of Kyiv.”).
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(where the legislature and the executive are located) after the Berlin
Wall fell in 1989.24
Third, national power can be placed in a specially constructed
capital metropolitan area. This new capital could have previously
been a nonexistent metropolitan area, which was largely the case for
Washington, D.C., before the United States decided to make it the
capital.25 The new capital could be located in an area that was a
smaller metropolitan area. The decision to make that smaller
metropolitan area into the capital is essentially creating a new
capital, because the metropolitan area was so small previously as
not to shape the new, formidable capital in a meaningful fashion.
Examples of this approach include the decision to construct a new
Malaysian capital in Putrajay,26 or the recent discussion about
Egypt constructing a new national capital metropolitan area.27
B.

The Implications of the Choices

This question of where to place national power has two
categories of implications. First, it influences the identity of the
officials exercising national power. Labor markets have been
changed by technology, but it is still the case that most people work
relatively close to where they reside, and most people do not move
great distances for employment opportunities.28 This tends to be
true even at the higher levels of employment.29 This means that
those working in government will be those who live near where
government is located. Because transportation costs play a major
role in where people work, and these costs tend to be higher outside
of the stable democracies,30 the location of national power will shape
who exercises national power even more in fragile democracies.
The location of national power, then, shapes the background of
those who serve in national office. One of the central challenges of a
fragile democratic regime is ensuring that wide ranges of political
forces are actually represented in national office. Constitution

24. See ÚSTAVNÍ SOUD [CONSTITUTIONAL COURT], http://www.usoud.cz/en
(last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
25. See KENNETH R. BOWLING, THE CREATION OF WASHINGTON, D.C.: THE
IDEA AND LOCATION OF THE AMERICAN CAPITAL 238–39 (1991).
26. See Sarah Moser, Putrajaya: Malaysia’s New Federal Administrative
Capital, 27 CITIES 285, 285 (2010).
27. See Matt Schiavenza, Egypt’s New Potemkin Capital, ATLANTIC (Mar.
15, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/egypt-to
-build-a-potemkin-capital/387826/?utm_source=btn-email-pckt.
28. See Richard Florida, Why Americans Are Moving Less: New Jobs Aren’t
Worth It, CITYLAB (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/work/2014/04/why
-americans-are-moving-less-new-jobs-arent-worth-it/8973/.
29. See Edward L. Glaeser & Janet E. Kohlhase, Cities, Regions and the
Decline of Transport Costs, 83 PAPERS REGIONAL SCI. 197, 223 (2004).
30. See David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1509–10 & n.14; infra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
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drafters focus on various design tools to achieve this diversity of
representation. The debate about parliamentary versus presidential
regimes for fragile democracies, for instance, features strong
disagreements about whether presidential or parliamentary systems
better open up the political process for a diverse range of officials.31
Another aspect of this representation debate is a locational feature.
Constitution drafters think about what political forces must be
represented in government as a means of thinking about where
governments should be located. During a chaotic moment in its
history, Nigeria moved parts of its capital from Lagos to Abuja so
that there would be more Muslims in government.32
The location of the national government shapes its identity not
just in practice, but also in perception. In stable democratic
systems, voters use political parties as heuristics to make decisions
about who does and should hold national power.33 In fragile
democracies, there is either one34 or no party brand with known
means to guide citizens.35 Places tend to be strong heuristics that
guide perceptions,36 and without party brands, citizens will turn to
place brands even more strongly. This means that the location of
national power will tell citizens who exercises national power.
Second, the location of national power influences the
interactions of the new national regime that is created by the new
constitutional system.
Our most important personal and
professional relationships are still overwhelmingly our most
physically proximate relationships.37 Placing national power is a

31. For a notable summary of the arguments and contribution to the
debate, see generally Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113
HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000) (comparing and contrasting American-style separation
of powers with “constrained parliamentarianism”).
32. See LAWRENCE J. VALE, ARCHITECTURE, POWER, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
134–35 (1992).
33. See ROBERT S. ERIKSON ET AL., THE MACRO POLITY 68 (2002); MORRIS P.
FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 89–98, 105
(1981) (discussing how individuals choose and change party identification).
34. For example, South Africa has a “dominant party” system, where one
party—the African National Congress—has won a majority of the recent
national elections. See Sujit Choudhry, ‘He Had a Mandate’: The South African
Constitutional Court and the African National Congress in a Dominant Party
Democracy, 2 CONST. CT. REV. 1, 3 (2009).
35. See George B. N. Ayittey, How the Multilateral Institutions
Compounded Africa’s Economic Crisis, 30 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 585, 594 (1999).
36. See generally Michael Manville, People, Race and Place: American
Support for Person- and Place-Based Urban Policy, 1973-2008, 49 URB. STUD.
3101 (2012) (examining whether Americans associate big cities with African
Americans); Harvey Molotch, Place in Product, 26 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL
RES. 665 (2002) (arguing that products can be tracers to the places from which
they come from).
37. See, e.g., Luís M. A. Bettencourt, The Origins of Scaling in Cities, 340
SCIENCE 1438, 1441 (2013) (“Institutions and industries that benefit from strong
mutual interactions may aggregate in space and time within the city . . . .”);
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means of shaping what relationships those in national power will
cultivate with those inside and outside of the national government.
II. THE MULTIPLE-CAPITAL APPROACH
Federalism assumes different governments that share
overlapping control over the same physical territory.38 Implied
within this definition of federalism is that these different
governments themselves are located in different places. There
would be much less—or no—point to federalism if the capitals of
California and New York were also in the District of Columbia.
Different physical locations have also become a more common
part of the exercise of national power. The most notable example of
the multiple-capital approach arose in the aftermath of World War
II in Germany. The Allied forces occupying Germany after World
War II insisted that German national power be spread out over
eight cities.39 Even with more national power located in Berlin, it is
still the case that important parts of the German national
government are separated among many different metropolitan
areas.40 The multiple-capital approach provides a geographical
safeguard ensuring a diverse range of officials working for and
interacting with the national government.
A.

Officials in Multiple-Capital Regimes

Multiple capitals diversify the officials in a national government
as powerfully as any other constitutional design tool available to
fragile democracies. For single capitals to employ officials from all
over a country, these officials must be willing to endure the direct
cost of relocating to the single capital. In many fragile democracies,
infrastructural limitations can make this direct cost a substantial
cost.41 That direct cost also entails substantial opportunity costs.
There is the opportunity cost that a substantial amount of travel
time to the single capital creates.42 There is the opportunity cost of
foregoing personal and professional relationships in the previous

Diana Mok et al., Does Distance Matter in the Age of the Internet?, 47 URB.
STUD. 2747, 2779 (2010) (“The frequency of face-to-face and phone contact
among various role relationships has hardly changed between the 1970s and
the 2000s.”).
38. In William Riker’s famous definition of federalism, “two levels of
government rule the same land and people.” WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM:
ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 11 (1964).
39. See Gordon A. Craig, Berlin, the Hauptstadt: Back Where It Belongs, 77
FOREIGN AFF. 161, 166–68 (1998).
40. See id. at 170.
41. See, e.g., Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy in Africa: African and
International Imperatives, 14 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 191, 197 (2000).
42. See Glaeser & Kohlhase, supra note 29, at 208–09.
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place of residence43—relationships that will also be harder to
maintain from a distance because of weaker infrastructure.
The benefits of relocating to the single capital will be lower
because of the discounted value of serving in government. In stable
democracies, many scholars have framed public service as a form of
deferred compensation.44 Officials rotate in and out of government.
The skills and relationships they developed in government result in
greater returns once out of government.45 In fragile democracies,
the benefits of public service are not as enormous. The potential for
a dramatic change in who runs a country could mean that the skills
and relationships built in government are worthless outside of
government.
The geographical dispersion of a country’s population will
substantially determine the diversity of officials in government.
Many fragile democracies are smaller in terms of square miles.46
This reduces the costs for individuals to relocate to the single
capital. A primate metropolitan area dominates many fragile
democracies.47 If there is a primate metropolitan area that houses
the national government, there are fewer types of officials present in
other places and missing from the capital metropolitan area.
B.

Official Interactions in Multiple-Capital Regimes

The fragile democratic regime that creates a multiple-capital
system increases the capacity of the national government to interact
with a diverse range of private forces.48 If the national government
wishes to obtain information about private forces outside of a single
capital, it can try to interact with these forces directly, but this
poses substantial complications. Information from a distance is less
precise and reliable than information from across the street.49 The
national government can decide to travel to areas outside of the
single capital, but this will generate the direct costs of travel as well

43. See Naomi Schoenbaum, Mobility Measures, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1169,
1174–75.
44. See Ackerman, supra note 31, at 708–09.
45. See id. at 709.
46. Compare The World Factbook—Country Comparison: Area, CIA,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder
/2147rank.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2015) (ranking countries by size using
square kilometers), with THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, DEMOCRACY INDEX
2014: DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 4–7 (2015), http://www.sudestada.com
.uy/Content/Articles/421a313a-d58f-462e-9b24-2504a37f6b56/Democracy-index2014.pdf (classifying several countries as flawed democracies or hybrid
regimes).
47. See Galiani & Kim, supra note 20, at 121–22.
48. See Merritt, supra note 17, at 194–95, 201.
49. See Michael Storper & Anthony J. Venables, Buzz: Face-to-Face Contact
and the Urban Economy, in INSTITUTIONS, INCENTIVES AND COMMUNICATION IN
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY 43, 61–62 (Michael Storper ed., 2004).
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as the costs of imprecise information that result from less frequent
interactions with physically distant individuals.50
While information is more easily obtained in the multiplecapital regime, it is more difficult for the multiple-capital regime to
act on this information. One of the tools of constitutional design to
weaken the state is to generate a series of transaction costs that the
state must endure in order to engage in some form of action.51 This
is usually done through a series of procedural hurdles like
federalism and the separation of powers.52 These procedural
hurdles mean either that government cannot act at all or that if it
can act, it must purchase the cost of consent of multiple actors in
order to overcome the veto gates they operate.53
One of the concerns about generating more representation is
that this representation can undermine the democratic process. A
national government with excess capacity to monitor private forces
can be a government that does not recognize and respect constraints
on power.54 A multiple-capital approach ensures that some part of
the national government is exposed to the full range of private forces
because some part of the national government is located in many
different metropolitan areas. This means that some part of the
national government is able to monitor private forces at lower cost
because of physical proximity. However, because the national
government itself is geographically fragmented, this reduces the
capacity of the national government to merge information about
private forces and coordinate a response. Indeed, related empirical
evidence has demonstrated that national governments with large
amounts of physically proximate information about private threats
can be particularly dangerous national governments.55
Private forces with excess capacity to monitor a national
government can also undermine the democratic process by
generating the threat of antidemocratic mob violence.56 A crucial

50. See id. at 62.
51. See Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4, 12 (1987).
52. See id. at 12–14.
53. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2338 (2006).
54. See Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions:
Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
1, 1 (1995).
55. See Ades & Glaeser, supra note 20, at 195 (“Dictatorships have central
cities that are, on average, 50 percent larger than their democratic
counterparts.”).
56. See, e.g., Wadah Khanfar, Egypt Must Get Back on the Path of
Democratic
Change,
THEGUARDIAN
(July
28,
2013,
4:00
PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/28/egypt-democraticchange-deep-state-violent.
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feature of a successful effort to overthrow a government is scale.57 It
requires many outraged citizens organizing and protesting in the
streets to create the kind of pressure that leads governments to
fall.58 Dispersing national power makes it harder for those trying to
overthrow a national government to succeed. Antidemocratic forces
have to organize and coordinate joint efforts across large physical
spaces, rather than organize and coordinate joint efforts in a single
place—say, Tahrir Square in Cairo in 2013.59 Indeed, a famous
saying about Germany was that “whoever took Berlin ruled
Germany.”60
III. THE PRIMATE-CAPITAL APPROACH
In addition to the decision about how many national capitals to
utilize, fragile democracies must decide which capitals to utilize.
The first—and most common—approach is to locate national power
in the primate metropolitan area in that country.61 In most fragile
democracies, this decision to locate national power in the primate
capital is not much of a conscious decision. There are no or very few
other metropolitan areas with the capacity to handle the national
government. The choice becomes either locating national power in a
primate capital or constructing an entirely new metropolitan area to
host national power.
The representative ambitions of fragile democracies can be
buttressed by the diverse range of people that live and work in the
primate capital—although this diverse range of people can live and
work all over a primate capital, meaning that where national power
is located within the primate capital becomes important. This
greater exposure to large numbers of diverse private forces, though,
poses risks that the primate capital will go to extremes, and that
either the national government will become too powerful or those

57. See generally Filipe R. Campante & Quoc-Anh Do, Inequality,
Redistribution, and Population (Harvard Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t
Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. RWP07-046, 2007)
(exploring the relationship between the size of a country’s population and the
threat of revolution).
58. Major violence tends to be a greater feature of life in major
metropolitan areas than in life elsewhere. See Dennis DiPasquale & Edward L.
Glaeser, The Los Angeles Riot and the Economics of Urban Unrest, 43 J. URB.
ECON. 52, 56 (1998) (“Urbanization is positively correlated with rioting, which
perhaps means that political unrest is easier to organize in cities.”).
59. Compare Mabin, supra note 17, at 171–72, 174–75 (discussing South
Africa’s multiple capitals and how it has retained those capitals following
Apartheid), with Shaimaa Fayed & Yasmine Saleh, Egyptians Flood Streets to
Demand Mursi Ouster, REUTERS (June 30, 2013, 11:08 PM), http://in
.reuters.com/article/2013/06/30/egypt-protests-idINDEE95T03W20130630
(discussing the millions involved in a protest in Egypt in June 2013).
60. Craig, supra note 39, at 165.
61. See Galiani & Kim, supra note 20, at 121.
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trying to overthrow the national government will be able to do so too
easily.
A.

Officials in Primate Capitals

The primate capital is meant to provide diverse representation
at the metropolitan level comparable to that provided by multiple
capitals among metropolitan areas.62 Metropolitan areas generally
encourage labor specialization because the larger numbers of
opportunities generate deep markets.63 Deep markets provide a
form of risk pooling, or insurance against “firm-specific shocks.”64
One can specialize in a particular area of economic or social life
because greater alternative opportunities ensure that as one door
closes, another specialized door opens. Greater learning within that
specialization is facilitated by the ease of knowledge spillovers in
metropolitan areas.65 With this greater specialization comes greater
productive benefits, as people can specialize in areas in which they
have a comparative advantage.66 These dynamics of metropolitan
life are part of the reason that metropolitan areas specialize in
particular features of economic or social life, rather than offering a
little bit of every feature of economic or social life.67
The primate capital—as compared to other metropolitan
forms—is substantial enough to encourage a broader range of
specializations. Deep labor can be specialized and especially
productive across many dimensions.68 Those from outside of the
62. It is not a primate city, but a similar argument was made when the
capital was moved from Bonn to Berlin after the fall of the Berlin Wall: “Berlin
will require us to become aware of arising social conflicts more directly than
Bonn would.” Andreas W. Daum, Capitals in Modern History: Inventing Urban
Spaces for the Nation, in BERLIN–WASHINGTON, 1800–2000: CAPITAL CITIES,
CULTURAL REPRESENTATION, AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES 3, 15 (Andreas W. Daum
& Christof Mauch eds., 2005) (quoting Deputy Otto Schily). The hope was that
Washington would eventually become a primate capital—it would become “the
Rome of America in the arts, the Berlin of America in education, and the Paris
of America as a city of beauty and pleasure.” Carl Abbott, International Cities
in the Dual Systems Model: The Transformations of Los Angeles and
Washington, 18 URB. HIST. Y.B. 41, 51 (1991).
63. See, e.g., James R. Baumgardner, The Division of Labor, Local Markets,
and Worker Organization, 96 J. POL. ECON. 509, 510 (1988); Christopher H.
Wheeler, Cities and the Growth of Wages Among Young Workers: Evidence from
the NLSY, 60 J. URB. ECON. 162, 165 (2006).
64. See Edward L. Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 139, 146
(1998).
65. See, e.g., ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 271–72 (8th ed.
1953).
66. See Glaeser, supra note 64, at 145–46.
67. See, e.g., Guy Dumais et al., Geographic Concentration as a Dynamic
Process, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 193, 193–97 (2002).
68. See Joseph Gyourko et al., Superstar Cities 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 12,355, 2006), http://www.nber.org/papers
/w12355.pdf.
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primate metropolitan area know of these many and different
specialties, and thus different types of people move to the primate
metropolitan area in pursuit of opportunities.69
For the national government, this means that a diverse labor
supply exists in the same metropolitan area as the national
government. Because a broader range of people are closer to the
national government, a broader range of individuals are more likely
to work for the national government.70 Moving into government in
the same metropolitan area would not entail the same costs to
personal71 and professional relationships72 that would be entailed by
moving across the country. Other industries outside of government
can benefit from being located proximate to the government, in the
form of reduced regulation or increased government contracts,73 and
a stint in government can be of assistance to the primate-capital
worker even after they serve in government.
There are limitations to the representational promise of the
primate capital. First, because of the primate capital’s proximate
diversity—diversity located within the same metropolitan area—
there are powerful forces narrowing diversity. Different forces tend
to converge when exposed to the same, place-specific stimuli. As
Cass Sunstein noted, “[p]eople frequently think and do what they
think and do because of what they think (relevant) others think and
do.”74 The “relevant others” shaping how we think tend to be those
with whom we have the strongest relationships.75 We have our

69. See DAVID K. IHRKE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY:
2008 TO 2009, at 16 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p20-565.pdf;
Yong Chen & Stuart S. Rosenthal, Local Amenities and Life-Cycle Migration:
Do People Move for Jobs or Fun?, 64 J. URB. ECON. 519, 519 (2008); Edward L.
Glaeser, A World of Cities: The Causes and Consequences of Urbanization in
Poorer Countries 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19,745,
2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19745.
70. See Galiani & Kim, supra note 20, at 128.
71. See, e.g., Mok et al., supra note 37, at 2750.
72. See, e.g., Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The
Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 490 (1985); Frank P. Romo &
Michael Schwartz, The Structural Embeddedness of Business Decisions: The
Migration of Manufacturing Plants in New York State, 1960 to 1985, 60 AM.
SOC. REV. 874, 879 (1995); Brian Uzzi, Social Structure and Competition in
Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of Embeddedness, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 35, 41–42
(1997).
73. H.G. OVERMAN & ANTHONY J. VENABLES, CITIES IN THE DEVELOPING
WORLD 9 (2005), http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0695.pdf.
74. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 16
(2001); see also Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the
Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 614 (2000) (summarizing this
literature about social influences).
75. On the power of those closest to us in our social networks, see Ronald S.
Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural
Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287, 1327–28 (1987); Nicholas A. Christakis &
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strongest relationships with those in the same metropolitan area.76
Exposure to the same place-specific, salient issues shapes what
issues those in the same metropolitan area think are important.77
Exposure to the same “epistemic communities” of policy experts in
the same metropolitan area creates convergence on how to view
these issues.78 The result is that all of these different forces in the
same metropolitan area—even the same primate capital—
converge.79 The primate capital might still feature more internal
heterogeneity than the major or the new capital, but it will have a
hard time maintaining the heterogeneity added by the multiplecapital approach where diversity is present but not proximate.
Second, a geographically concentrated national government
within the primate capital can reduce the degree to which the
national government features the diversity of the primate capital.
More metropolitan areas—particularly in poorer, democratizing
countries—feature geographically dispersed primate capitals, more
akin to Los Angeles than to New York City.80 While transporting
goods has become much cheaper, it is still relatively costly to
transport human beings across places, particularly in countries with

James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Network over 32
Years, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 377 (2007).
76. See Bettencourt, supra note 37, at 1439; Mok et al., supra note 37, at
2750.
77. See Adam K. Anderson & Elizabeth A. Phelps, Lesions of the Human
Amygdala Impair Enhanced Perception of Emotionally Salient Events, 411
NATURE 305, 305–06 (2001) (explaining that the human mind retains negative
information much more effectively than neutral information, which can cause
one population to view an emotional event as a much more important issue
than another that has not dealt with that issue directly); Thad Williamson,
Sprawl, Spatial Location, and Politics: How Ideological Identification Tracks
the Built Environment, 36 AM. POL. RES. 903, 904 (2008) (showing a strong
correlation between spatial characteristics and voting patterns).
78. See José E. Alvarez, Do States Socialize?, 54 DUKE L.J. 961, 969 (2005)
(“[F]actors such as . . . individuals’ connections to relevant epistemic
communities elsewhere matter a great deal.”).
79. For evidence of this, see Seth C. McKee & Jeremy M. Teigen, Probing
the Reds and Blues: Sectionalism and Voter Location in the 2000 and 2004 U.S.
Presidential Elections, 28 POL. GEOGRAPHY 484, 485 (2009); Jeffrey J. Mondak &
Damarys Canache, Personality and Political Culture in the American States, 67
POL. RES. Q. 26, 27–28 (2014); Peter J. Rentfrow el al., A Theory of the
Emergence, Persistence, and Expression of Geographic Variation in
Psychological Characteristics, 3 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 339, 340–41, 350 (2008);
Wheeler, supra note 63, at 165.
80. Compare Edward L. Glaeser, Urban Colossus: Why Is New York
America’s Largest City?, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., Dec. 2005, at 7,
9 (describing the density of New York City), with Nigel Harris, Urbanisation,
Economic Development and Policy in Developing Countries, 14 HABITAT INT’L,
no. 4, 1990, at 3, 23 (noting that some primate cities in smaller low-income
countries spread out to the metropolitan area and actually see a decline in
inner-city population).
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less developed transportation infrastructure.81 This means that the
location of employment within a metropolitan area will shape whom
from within that metropolitan area will work there.82 The Cairo
model of a national government, which is concentrated within the
primate capital, will attract fewer different types of officials than
will the Tunis model of a national government, which is more
geographically dispersed within the primate capital.
B.

Official Interactions in Primate Capitals

Because government officials—like everyone else—tend to
interact more often and more meaningfully with those more
physically proximate to them, government officials in a primate
capital are interacting with a diverse range of private forces. This
can generate representative extremes. On the one hand, a national
government in a primate capital can monitor and regulate private
forces at a (perhaps excessive) discount. On the other hand, private
forces can more easily coordinate a response to the national
government that can lead to violent overthrows of democratic
regimes. These are the reasons why evidence has suggested that
primate capitals can be bad for democratic stability in certain
situations.83
The primate capital has proven problematic for democratic
consolidation because of the greater ease with which the state can
increase state capacity.84 The primate capital will feature the most
important individuals from various industries and other private
forces.85 Because of their proximity to the national government, the
national government can use its many parts to monitor these
private forces. This monitoring may be facilitated by the number of
those in government who previously worked in the private sector,
and thus have the kind of relationships with those in the private
sector that facilitate oversight.
The primate-capital government can use this more easily
available information about private citizens in one of two ways. It
can decide to ensure citizen satisfaction with government by buying
them off with the provision of greater public goods. A national
government aware of the private forces’ displeasure may have a
desire to target public services to these private forces.86 With more
81. See Glaeser & Kohlhase, supra note 29, at 208; Schleicher, supra note
30, at 1520.
82. See Paul W. Rhode & Koleman S. Strumpf, Assessing the Importance of
Tiebout Sorting: Local Heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990, 93 AM. ECON. REV.
1648, 1649 (2003).
83. See Ades & Glaeser, supra note 20, at 199.
84. See id. at 198–99.
85. See Gilles Duranton & Diego Puga, Nursery Cities: Urban Diversity,
Process Innovation, and the Life Cycle of Products, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1454,
1461 (2001).
86. See Campante & Do, supra note 57, at 6.
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resources flowing to the private sector in the primate capital, there
is more of a reason for those from outside of the primate capital to
move to the primate capital in search of economic success. This, in
turn, generates even more pressure to expand government to
accommodate the demands of the new residents of the primate
capital. In such a situation, the primate-capital government risks
being too large and coercive for democratic consolidation.
The primate-capital government can also use the greater
information it receives from its location to ensure citizen obedience
through force rather than the provision of public goods. The
primate-capital government can more easily determine which
private forces pose a risk to the stability of the government. It can
also more easily deploy intelligence or military force within the
primate capital in response. This is part of the reason why
dictatorships feature and generate such large central cities.87
Dictatorships use coercive state power to ensure the compliance of a
large range of forces.88 Dictatorships located outside of a primate
capital struggle to do this as well because it is more costly for
dictatorships to project coercive power in distant locations.89
At the other extreme, the primate capital increases the risk of
democratic revolutions.
Democratic revolutions are events
determined by scale.90 The more people available to overthrow the
government, the greater the ease of assembling the kind of massive
mob needed to do so. More than any other metropolitan area, the
primate capital supplies a deep bench of individuals capable of
organizing to overthrow a government. The twenty-million people
in the Cairo metropolitan area provided ample support to generate a
critical mass in Tahrir Square to overthrow the government in
2013.91
The representative resonance of the primate capital is another
reason why the representativeness of the primate capital can go to
excess. The fact that it was Tahrir Square hosting the protests in
2013 added to the resonance of the protests. The visual image of
protestors occupying major government buildings and major streets
signaled the importance of the uprising.92 Information about
successful protest activity tends to spread quickly and generate

87. See Ades & Glaeser, supra note 20, at 195.
88. See id. at 198–99.
89. See Jonathan N. Markowitz & Christopher J. Fariss, Going the
Distance: The Price of Projecting Power, 39 INT’L INTERACTIONS 119, 121–22
(2013).
90. See, e.g., DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 58, at 52–53.
91. See Ford, supra note 4; see also Jeremy Wallace, Cities, Redistribution,
and Authoritarian Regime Survival, 75 J. POL. 632, 634 (2013) (“With increased
urban concentration, there are more potential malcontents in geographic
locations that threaten the economic and political livelihood of the regime.”).
92. See Ford, supra note 4.
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other successful protest activity.93 Protest activity in the primate
capital can spread particularly rapidly.
IV. THE MAJOR-CAPITAL APPROACH
Another approach for the fragile democratic system is to place
the national government in a major metropolitan area that is not a
primate metropolitan area. This could be because there is no
primate metropolitan area in a country and so there is no choice but
to put the national government in a major metropolitan area that is
not the primate metropolitan area (e.g., Washington, D.C., in the
United States). Or, this could be because there is a primate
metropolitan area, but a choice is made to place the national
government in another metropolitan area (e.g., Ankara in Turkey,
even though Istanbul could be considered the primate metropolitan
area).
One caveat should be made to this major capital approach: it is
possible only in rare circumstances to place the national government
in a minor metropolitan area.94
This is because national
governments in the twenty-first century tend to be large and
complicated endeavors that—because of their scale and size—
inevitably turn the metropolitan areas around them into large and
complicated endeavors as well.
When there are smaller
governments, it is possible that they could be placed in a minor
metropolitan area.95
Major capitals are similar to primate capitals in that the
national government is part of a major metropolitan area. What
differentiates major capitals from primate capitals is also what
makes them less representative. With fewer private forces in the
capital area, there are fewer of these forces represented in the
national government. This also reduces the representative risks of
the primate capital because the major capital undermines the
capacity of the national government to monitor private forces and
for private forces to monitor—and even overthrow—the national
government.

93. See, e.g., Sophia J. Wallace et al., Spatial and Temporal Proximity:
Examining the Effects of Protests on Political Attitudes, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 433,
445 (2014).
94. See generally Moser, supra note 26 (discussing Malaysia’s decision to
build a federal administrative capital in Putrajaya).
95. Consider the example of smaller American states like Vermont, whose
capital is in Montpelier (with a population of less than 10,000). See State &
County QuickFacts—Montpelier (City), Vermont, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/50/5046000.html (last updated Oct. 14,
2015, 4:36 PM). Or consider a smaller country like Grenada, with a capital of
St. George of less than 40,000 people. See About Grenada, GOV’T GRENADA,
http://www.gov.gd/about_grenada.html (last updated May 7, 2013, 10:15 AM).
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Officials in Major Capitals

Major metropolitan areas that do not rise to the level of primate
metropolitan areas will lack some part of a country’s population.
Metropolitan areas tend to specialize in particular industries.96 If
what defines a primate metropolitan area is that it has a little bit of
everything, then what defines a major (but nonprimate)
metropolitan area is that the major metropolitan area is missing a
larger number of these industries. If the national government
wishes to attract those missing forces to reside there and possibly
work in government, it must endure substantial costs. A potential
government staffer coming from another place in the country will
have to be willing to pay the direct costs of relocating to the major
capital. The potential government staffer must be willing to endure
the opportunity costs of forsaking past personal and professional
relationships. All of this must be done for the uncertain benefit of
service in government in the major capital. That service must be
long and substantial enough to generate future returns if the staffer
wishes to stay in the major capital, or related enough to industries
in their previous place of residence that government service will
generate future returns upon returning to the previous place of
residence.
What this means, then, is that the decision to place the national
government in a major metropolitan area—and the particular major
metropolitan area selected—is and is seen as an act of affiliation.
Additionally, if the major metropolitan area is already home to other
substantial industries, then the placement of the national
government there is and is seen as affiliating with these other major
industries. The decision to place the first democratic regime of
Ukraine in Kiev, for instance, was a signal of affiliation with more
Western-oriented forces that had been causing problems for the
more Russian-oriented interests in other parts of the country.97 In
many situations, the major metropolitan area is not home to enough
other substantial industries to overcome the placement of the
national government there.98 The major capital then becomes a
company town, with the company being the government.
96. See Sukkoo Kim, Expansion of Markets and the Geographic Distribution
of Economic Activities: The Trends in U.S. Regional Manufacturing Structure,
1860–1987, 110 Q.J. ECON. 881, 903 (1995); Sukkoo Kim, Regions, Resources,
and Economic Geography: Sources of U.S. Regional Comparative Advantage,
1880–1987, 29 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 1, 1–2 (1999).
97. See Chrystia Freeland, Kiev Protests: Ukraine’s Democracy Fatigue,
PROSPECT MAG. (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features
/ukraine-euromaidan-yanukovych-protest-kie.
98. See, e.g., Ukraine Economy: How Bad Is the Mess and Can It Be Fixed?,
BBC (May 1, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26767864; see also
Daryna Krasnolutska & Volodymyr Verbyany, Cracks in Ukrainian Economy
Surface Beyond Kiev’s Cloak of Calm, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 1, 2015, 5:00 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-01/ukrainian-economy-starts-
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Official Interactions in Major Capitals

The private forces that are missing from the major capital not
only reduce the range of people that will serve in government, but
also reduce the range of people that the national government will be
able to monitor.
With private forces farther away, national
governments have different choices of how to monitor them, none of
which are as efficient as the primate-capital approach. National
governments can themselves decentralize, opening offices within the
government that are located outside of the major capital and report
to officials in the major capital. National governments can rely on
subnational governments to monitor these private forces outside of
the major capital. In either situation, though, the distance between
these government officials doing the monitoring generates
substantial agency costs.99
The private forces that are missing from the major capital are
also less able to interact with the national government. This can be
good if these private forces missing from the capital are
undermining democratic consolidation, which can also undermine
the democratic process in the national government.100 Many Latin
American countries transitioning to democracy benefited from the
absence of authoritarian forces in the capital metropolitan area.101
This can be bad if these private forces missing from the capital are
crucial to democratic consolidation. Before Lagos was the clear
Nigerian primate metropolitan area, the absence of certain tribes
from Lagos made the Nigerian national government never fully
representative of the entire country.102
Because these private forces are missing from major capitals,
the risks of revolutions in major capitals are lower than the risks of
revolutions in primate capitals.103 There are problems of scale in
the major capital, meaning that there might not be enough people or
private power to overthrow the national government. There are also
problems of control in the major capital, meaning that simply
capturing the major capital does not capture the entire
governmental infrastructure of the country (there will be
to-buckle-behind-cloak-of-calm-in-kiev (detailing further the problems with the
Ukrainian economy).
99. See, e.g., Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, Monitoring America, WASH.
POST, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/monitoring
-america/1 (last visited Oct. 26, 2015) (discussing how the Department of
Homeland Security monitors smaller, distant agencies at a high cost).
100. See David Fontana, The Narrowing of Federal Power by the American
Political Capital, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 733, 736 (2015).
101. See, e.g., Edward L. Gibson, Boundary Control: Subnational
Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries, 58 WORLD POL. 101, 131–32 (2005).
102. See Omolade Adejuyigbe, The Case for a New Federal Capital in
Nigeria, 8 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 301, 304 (1970).
103. See Fontana, supra note 100, at 754–55; Goldberg, supra note 10
(manuscript at 9).
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government officials or sympathizers in other metropolitan areas
who must be captured too).
V. THE NEW-CAPITAL APPROACH
Another approach—a particularly expensive one—is to
construct a new metropolitan area to house the national
government. The ambitions of the new capital are usually explicitly
representative: a new capital will be a new (democratic) start that
will give everyone a chance to work for and access the national
government.
A.

Officials in New Capitals

One of the arguments for the new capital is that it creates the
potential for equal representation in government.
Existing
metropolitan areas make it easier for some forces to reside and work
there. Those already residing in a metropolitan area are more likely
to stay there than those who are not from the metropolitan area to
move there.104 By contrast, everyone has to endure the direct costs
of relocation to move to the new capital. Everyone has to endure the
opportunity costs of forsaking existing personal and professional
relationships in their place of origin. The new capital is the equal
capital.
There are limitations to the idea of the new capital as the equal
capital. The new capital has to be located somewhere in the
country. If it is centrally located, that fact might increase the
chance that it is equally accessible to all in the country.105 Even
then, differences in transportation networks might not make it
equally accessible from all parts of the country. A new capital is
also a company town, dedicated to hosting the national government.
This means that some people—particularly those less interested in a
career in or debates about government—will be less inclined to
relocate to the new capital.106
B.

Official Interactions in New Capitals

Official interactions in the new capital are likely to be with a
narrower range of private forces than in the primate or major
capital. The new capital is specifically constructed to be a company
town—that is what makes it a “new” capital. The result is that

104. See Jae Hong Kim, Residential and Job Mobility: Interregional
Variation and Their Interplay in US Metropolitan Areas, 51 URB. STUD. 2863,
2866, 2867 fig.1 (2014).
105. James Madison remarked at the Constitutional Convention that it was
important that “every part of the community should have the power of sending,
with equal facility, to the seat of Government such representatives . . . .” 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 862 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
106. See Fontana, supra note 100, at 745–46.
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there will be a narrower range of private forces existing in the new
capital.107 Those with the greatest incentive to base themselves in
the new capital will be those working for, or closely with, the
national government, excluding from the new capital many other
private forces. This situation may constrain the capacity of the
national government to monitor the limited number of private forces
in the new capital, but it may also constrain the capacity of private
forces to monitor the national government because so few of them
will be in the new capital.
Even with their narrowing effects, new capitals tend to be
dynamic places characterized by creativity rather than
narrowness.108 The mere act of serving in the new capital is meant
to generate new officials. New locations disrupt established and
problematic practices and serve as a place of “creative
destruction.”109 Conventional wisdom tends not to travel well across
space.110 Some countries, such as Malaysia, move capital cities to
distance themselves from corrosive colonial pasts and create new
patterns of government.111
CONCLUSION
Democratic revolutions tend to be affiliated with particular
places. Not many outside of Egypt knew of Tahrir Square before,
but now Tahrir Square is known as the home of the Egyptian
Revolution of 2011 and a central place in the story of the Arab
Spring. The Berlin Wall is the place known as the home of the
democratic revolutions in 1989. Place is at the core of our narratives
of how countries start the democratic process.
Place also needs to be at the core of our narratives of how
countries continue—and fail or succeed—at the process of
democratic consolidation. This Symposium Essay has attempted to
start that conversation by focusing on one aspect of place and
democratic consolidation: where the capitals of national

107. See id. at 739, 754 (describing how the dominance of the federal
government in Washington D.C.’s economy limited the influence of private
forces).
108. See Moser, supra note 26, at 285 (describing Malaysia’s new capital
Putrajaya as “a stable, prosperous, progressive, and technologically
sophisticated Muslim country, [that] at the same time, showcase[s] Malaysia’s
rootedness in traditional culture and religion.”).
109. Cf. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83
(1942) (“This process of creative destruction is the essential fact about
capitalism.”).
110. See Meric S. Gertler, Tacit Knowledge and the Economic Geography of
Context, or the Undefinable Tacitness of Being (There), 3 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY
75, 79 (2003) (identifying tacit knowledge as hard to transmit across distance).
111. See Moser, supra note 26, at 289 (“[T]he construction of a new capital
was seen to be . . . a move that would distance Malaysia from its colonial past
while emphasizing its new identity as a sovereign nation.”).

W09_FONTANA

1006

(DO NOT DELETE)

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

12/8/2015 6:55 PM

[Vol. 50

governments are placed and how that shapes the representative
nature of new democratic regimes. If we want to know who will
work for and with democratizing regimes, we need to know where
these regimes will be.

